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balance. In its wake came a rise in prices. The inflation hit hardest at the peasants and other poor classes in the vicinity of Canton, i.e., in eastern Kwangsi and southern Kwangtung.[23] Their livelihood was further reduced when English manufactured goods began to displace the handicraft industry on which the Chinese peasant relied for a necessary supplement to his farm income. The hardships, discontents, and resentments against the ruling power were further intensified by drought and famine. The result was the Taiping Rebellion.

C. The Taiping Rebellion

The rebellion started in Kwangsi just before the middle of the nineteenth century as disorganized pillaging and robbing by secret societies and bandit gangs.[24] These traditional outlets for social discontent were often indistinguishable one from the other and frequently became the nuclei for movements seeking political power. At the same time, numbers of Canton's businessmen and gentry became disgusted with Manchu corruption

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23. H. B. Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, Vol. I, London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1910, pp. 173-92. Also see Teng Ssu-yü, New Light on the History of the Taiping Rebellion, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1950, pp. 43-47, which includes an analysis by Tseng Kuo-fan of the causes of unrest in 1852.

24. Teng, op. cit., p. 48.

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and weakness in resisting foreign encroachment. They moved into adjoining Kwangsi and helped give the unorganized bandit and secret society groups cohesion and a goal -- the establishment of a new regime and social order. From Canton's lower class, numbers of unemployed migrated to Kwangsi to swell the essentially peasant ranks of the rebels.[25]

The head of this movement, Hung Hsiu-ch'üan, was a native of Kwangtung. He had met repeated failure in the official examinations, but had acquired a smattering of Christianity and western socio-economic reformism in Canton. Convinced in a dream that he was the brother of Jesus, Hung fused his limited knowledge of those western secular and religious concepts with traditional Chinese ideas to evolve a reform program that became the ideology of the Taipings. With the ambition of becoming emperor, Hung led the rebels north in 1850 to overrun most of China and threaten the existence of the throne for fifteen years.[26]

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25. Ibid., p. 59.

26. On the Taiping Rebellion, see Teng, op. cit.; G. E. Taylor, "The Taiping Rebellion: Its Economic Background and Social Theory," The Chinese Social and Political Science Review, Peiping [Peking], January, 1933, pp. 345-614; and Morse, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 438-71; Vol. II, pp. 64-110.

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Today, the Communists laud the Taiping Rebellion, minimizing its effect in weakening the central government's power to resist foreign penetration. At a time when the western powers were making new demands and using force to back them up, the dynasty was reduced in prestige and deprived of revenue from its richest provinces. The destruction wrought by the Taipings cut into the throne's revenue for years afterward.

The Communists also make much of the revolutionary peasant nature of the Taipings. Although peasant unrest did have a major share in instigating the movement, it was rejected by a large part of the peasantry. The small landowners found no attraction in the Taipings' promise to communalize land-holding and institute other radical departures from the traditional social, political and economic system. Never instituted on any broad scale, the doctrine showed many affinities to an enlightened Communism. Furthermore, it was at the hands of a predominantly peasant army that the Taipings met their first serious setbacks and final defeat. The force was organized and directed by a Hunanese scholar-official, Tseng Kuo-fan.

D. Tseng Kuo-fan

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Tseng is vilified by the present Chinese regime as an utterly ruthless, feudal-minded representative of the scholar-gentry class. In truer perspective, Tseng was one of the last great Confucian statesmen and one of the greatest exemplars of the highest traditions of the scholar

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of these men were from Kwangtung. When the Manchu Dowager Empress Tz'u Hsi resisted the new measures of the "Hundred-Day Reform" of 1898 and proved incompetent to resist encroachment by the foreigner, a large part of the reform sentiment turned toward revolutionary republicanism. In that camp also, the leader was a native of Kwangtung -- Sun Yat-sen.

Until the May 4th Movement of 1919, the membership of the various revolutionary organizations evolved by Sun Yat-sen was largely composed of natives of Kwangtung. It consisted mostly of youths educated abroad or in missionary schools, merchants and overseas emigrants from Kwangtung, and opportunistic militarists and their armies based in Kwangsi. Working with, if not within, the various revolutionary organizations was the membership of various secret societies. They were strongest in the Central-South Region below the Yangtze River.[31]

E. Kwangtung and Kwangsi Separatism

The separatist tendency of Kwangtung and Kwangsi was strengthened with the failure of the

31. S. Chen and R. Payne, Sun Yat-sen, A Portrait, New York, John Day. Co., 1946, pp. 52-54 and passim. Also see Lyon Sharman, Sun Yat-sen, His Life and Meaning: A Critical Biography, New York, John Day Co., 1934, pp. 61-63; and MacNair, op. cit., pp. 8-9, 25-26, 65-72.

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1911 revolution. Between 1913 and 1923, various Kwangsi-Kwangtung warlords maintained a series of independent regimes. Open military rule was on three occasions varied by a show of republican government headed by Sun Yat-sen.

By 1925, Sun with Russian aid and advice had built up an effective party and army at Canton which were able to establish supremacy over the warlord element. The Kuomintang consolidation of power was helped immensely by a combined strike and boycott in Canton and Hong Kong against the British from June 1925 to October 1926. While anti-imperialist and revolutionary enthusiasm was at its height, the Kuomintang under the leadership of the Russian agent Borodin and Chiang Kai-shek began the northward expedition to unite all China.[32]

No sooner was China nominally united by the Kuomintang in 1928 than the two southern provinces reasserted their autonomy under military leaders who had participated in the northern march. In Kwangsi, Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi maintained a semi-autonomous

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32. The degree to which the revolutionary movement up to 1928 was almost exclusively a Kwangtung and Central-South affair is clearly evident in the detailed account of MacNair, op. cit., which takes the account up to 1930.

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provincial government. It was noted as a model of discipline and organization. Both men were highly critical of Chiang Kai-shek, but they rallied to the national cause when Japan attacked China in 1937. Li Tsung-jen won new fame by leading his troops to one of China's few victories at T'aierhchuang in 1938.[33]

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G. Sun Yat-sen

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Overshadowing the militarist Ch'en Chi-t'ang, who controlled Kwangtung for most of the period from 1928 to 1937, were the province's civilian contributions to the revolution. Sun Yat-sen stood head and shoulders above the rest.[34] He is still a revolutionary symbol which neither the Communists nor the Kuomintang can completely ignore.

Born in 1868, Sun was active in every phase of revolutionary work during the three decades following Japan's defeat of China in 1895. The organizations he evolved -- the Hsing Chung Hui

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33. H. Freyne, China's New Deal, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1943, pp. 174-75; and P.M.A. Linebarger, The China of Chiang K'ai-shek [sic]: A Political Study, Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1941, p. 102.

34. The main sources for Sun Yat-sen are Chen and Payne, op. cit., Sharman, op. cit., and M. B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1954.

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when the Communists overran China. The two most famous of his three American-educated sisters are the widow of Sun Yat-sen and the wife of Chiang Kai-shek. Madame Sun opposed Chiang while he was in control on the Mainland, continued to stress the leftist, social-reform side of her husband's program, and now holds high official position in Red China. Madame Chiang is credited with converting her husband to Christianity, tutoring him in the civilian graces, and inspiring and advising him in his conduct of government. She still heads the equivalent of a women's auxiliary of the Kuomintang and continues to be active in social welfare work at her husband's side on Formosa.[38]

F. The Revolutionary Center at Wuhan

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The other great center of both the 1911 and the 1923-27 revolutions was Wuhan, a complex of the three cities of Wuchang, Hanyang, and Hankow, in Hupeh Province. Wuhan was the collection and trans-shipment center for the rich Yangtze Valley and one of China's first industrial centers based on a modern iron and steel mill at Hanyang. Revolutionary propaganda had made its mark among the city's workers and the imperial

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38. On T. V. Soong, see references in footnote 36. On Madame Sun and Madame Chiang, see Emily Hahn, The Soong Sisters, Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc., 1943.

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troops stationed nearby, and it was in this city that the 1911 revolution was ignited. The accidental explosion of a bomb at the revolutionary headquarters in Hankow on October 10th forced the plotters to begin action prematurely. They were joined by large numbers of imperial troops, and the city became the center of revolutionary resistance against the government forces until the Ch'ing Dynasty was forced from the throne.[39]

In 1927, Wuhan again became a revolutionary focal-point after one element of the Kuomintang army captured that city. It then became the scene of a power struggle between the Communists and the Kuomintang led by Chiang Kai-shek. With the support of Shanghai industrialists and the forces of warlords within the ranks of the revolutionary army at Wuhan or in the vicinity of the city, Chiang emerged victorious. He turned the revolution to the right. The Russian advisors were expelled from the country and the Communists from the Kuomintang.[40]

J. The Battleground of Honan, Hupeh, and Hunan

From the time of the Taiping Rebellion until

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39. Chen and Payne, op. cit., pp. 90-97.

40. The most detailed account of the Kuomintang-Communist split, written from a leftist point of view, is Harold Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, rev. ed., Stanford, Calif., Stanford Univ. Press, 1951, expecially pp. 111-237. A shorter, neutral account is given in R. C. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, Stanford, Calif., Stanford Univ. Press, 1953, pp. 66-121.

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the invasion of China by Japan, the provinces of Hunan, Hupeh, and Honan were a frequent battleground. During the political chaos that followed the death of Yüan Shih-k'ai in 1916, Honan was subjected to the exploitations of various warlords, ambitiously moving northeast with the intent of seizing Peking or retreating to the southwest after being ousted from the national capital. Hupeh and Hunan were likewise exploited by warlords, as those in the North tried to extend their power southward and the Kwangsi-Kwangtung faction attempted to establish themselves in the North. During and after the northward march of the Kuomintang armies, the provinces were the scene of violent peasant uprisings and suppressions. With the National Government seated in Nanking in 1928, the three provinces became an area of contention between the Kwangtung-Kwangsi warlords and the central government's forces.[41] 669

K. Mao Tse-tung

Out of the turmoil in Hunan and Hupeh in these years came a number of the Communist leaders who today hold high places in the current regime. Hunan's most famous revolutionary product is Mao Tse-tung. The leader of the 668

41. That these provinces were continually overrun by one group after another was due to their lack of natural defenses and their position between the center of political power at Peking and the natural havens for lawless or revolutionary elements in the South and West. Being food surplus producing provinces, they also were coveted by ambitious factions.

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IV. THE RISE AND VICTORY OF COMMUNISM

A. The Prewar Period

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When the struggle for power at Wuhan ended in a Kuomintang victory, a small Communist-indoctrinated part of the original force which had captured the city retreated south. These and other elements that had been organizing peasant uprisings in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hunan, Hupeh, and Kiangsi maintained a wandering and precarious existence for the next three years.

By 1930 they had established small, isolated bases throughout the Central-South Region from the Hunan-Hupeh border south. The strongest concentration was in Kiangsi, where the Communists organized the first Chinese Central Soviet Government in 1931.[43]

The fifth of a series of "annihilation campaigns" launched by the National Government against the Kiangsi Soviet between 1930 and 1934 was successful. The Communists' main body was forced out of the Central-South Region on its

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43. The events of this period are not yet altogether clear, but informative accounts are available in B. I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1951, pp. 46-171; North, Moscow and the Chinese Communists, pp. 79-146, Isaacs, op. cit., pp. 111-322; Snow, op. cit., pp. 42-56, 140-62, 350-53.

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six-thousand-mile "Long March" which finally ended in north-central Shensi.[44] Remnants of the former soviets in the region became active again only during the war. Their greatest strength was in the Pearl River delta area, Hainan Island, and the Leichou Peninsula across from it on the Mainland. Other remnants were formed into the New Fourth Army. It operated in East China but extended its guerrilla activities along the Yangtze River into easter Hupeh, Hunan, and Kiangsi. After 1944, the Communist Eighth Route Army expanded its operations steadily southward until it controlled a large part of Honan.[45]

B. Post-war Victory

A government offensive launched in July 1946 drove the bulk of the Communist forces out of the Central-South Region.[46] The only

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44. Snow, op. cit., pp. 162-96.

45. See Gunther Stein, The Challenge of Red China, New York, Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1945, pp. 314-15, 322-25, 326-31, and map facing p. 458; also Agnes Smedley, Battle Hymn of China, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1943, pp. 247-493.

46. The names, dates, and campaigns in this section are largely taken from a Communist source, which is accurate in regard to those facts as far as can be determined by checking against other, scattered sources: Liao Kai-lung, From Yenan to Peking, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1954, pp. 15-17, 32-38, 49-50, 62-65, 90-107.

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Communist activity there until mid-1947 consisted of thrusts by the regular army at the Lunghai Railway between K'aifeng and Hsüchow, and guerrilla actions in various places, including Kwangtung and Hainan. 669

The Communists began their return in force to the Central-South Region on August 23, 1947, when units of the Red Army under Ch'en Keng and Hsieh Fu-chih crossed the Yellow River from southern Shansi into western Honan. They spread over the whole region between the Yangtze and the Yellow rivers and from the Han River in the west to the sea in the east. At the end of 1947, the Communists established there what they called the Central Plain Liberated Area. It consisted of isolated stretches of countryside, particularly along strategic communication lines. The major cities with their communications hubs and environs remained in Kuomintang hands.

After winning decisive victories in Manchuria during the summer and early fall of 1948, the Communists reorganized their forces. The armies which had originally fought in the Northwest, the Central Plain area, the East, and the Northeast were renamed respectively the First, Second, Third, and Fourth field armies. Between November 1948 and January 1949, the Second Field Army under Liu Po-ch'eng and the Third Field Army under Ch'en I waged the "Huai-Hai" campaign, winning key victories at Hsüchou in northern Kiangsu and at Yungch'ang in eastern Honan. With the latter victory,

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January 19, Kuomintang resistance north of the Yangtze River was broken.

In the following three months, the opposing camps talked peace while each moved its troops into position for the battle shaping up south of the Yangtze. Meanwhile, the Kwangsi General Li Tsung-jen, newly elected vice president of the National Government, took over as chief executive when Chiang Kai-shek resigned the presidency on January 21, 1949. Less than a month later, the capital of the National Government was moved from Nanking to Canton. At the same time, government financial resources, official personnel, and members of the armed forces began to be withdrawn to Formosa.

By April 20, 1949, the Communists were ready to move with the Second and Third field armies. They struck across the Yangtze River between Hankow and Nanking. As they swept southward in East China, the Fourth Field Army under Lin Piao smashed into Wuhan on May 17. Five days later, Nanchang, capital of Kiangsi Province, was in the hands of the Third Army.

In less than two months, the bulk of the Fourth Field Army was in position along the Yangtze from Wuhan westward to the gorges above Ichang. On July 12, it thrust simultaneously into southern Hupeh and northern Hunan while the Second Field Army crossed the Kan River into eastern Hunan. The governor of Hunan, Ch'eng Ch'ien, and the commander of the government's First Army Group in the province, Ch'en

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Ming-jen, defected to the conquerors less than a month later as the Red Army moved in on Changsha. 669

By October, the Red Army was fighting in Kwangtung. Canton fell October 14, and twelve days later the main forces of Yu Han-mou's Kwangtung Army were destroyed. Between November 7 and December 11, the "People's Liberation Army" overran southwestern Kwangtung and all Kwangsi. The deciding point was reached December 4 when two army groups under the Kwangsi general Pai Ch'ung-hsi were encircled and routed on the Kwangtung-Kwangsi border. With a part of his force, Pai escaped to Indo-China. From there he made his way to Formosa where he occupies a position in strategic military planning. At about the same time, Li Tsung-jen left China for the United States. Hainan Island, off the coast of Kwangtung, was taken in April 1950, bringing the entire Central-South Region under Communist control.

The rapid occupation of the five southern provinces of the Central-South Region indicates the extent of Kuomintang collapse by mid-1949. The people of the region were thoroughly sick of fighting after a century of rebel invasions, warlord conflicts, Japanese occupation, and civil war. Any regime that promised peace and stability would have been welcomed. To the great majority of China's population, the peasants, the struggle for power was none of their business. They stood aside waiting for the winner to emerge, and accepted the victory of the Red Army as the beginning of a new dynasty which had inherited the "mandate of Heaven" from the discredited Kuomintang.

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STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

I. MILITARY CONQUEST

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The present government of the Communist regime in Central-South China is a continuation of the Chung-yüan, or Central China Provisional Government, which was established by the Communists in December 1948. The Communists look upon this region, which consists of the six provinces of Honan, Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi, as the birthplace of Chinese Communism, for within its borders, Mao Tse-tung, Li Hsien-nien, and Fang Fang, among others, began their revolutionary activities.

Although Communist revolutionary leaders failed to keep these provinces as strongholds before World War II, two years after the war, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Liu Po-ch'eng emerged from hiding and became active in an area extending from the Yellow River in the north to the Yangtze Valley in the south, and west from the Han River to the Tientsin-- P'u-k'ou (Pukow) railroad in the east.

At the end of 1948, when the battle of Huai Hai was in progress, the Communist Field Army, under Ch'en-I, was joined by the Communist Second Field Army, under Liu Po-ch'eng, which had been fighting in the vicinity of Ta-pieh Shan Range in North China, and the Communist Fourth Field Army, under Lin Piao, which had been active in northeast China (Manchuria). One and a half years after the fall of Canton and Hainan Island, the conquest of Central-South China was complete.

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As the army of Lin Piao entered the battle from the northeast along the Peking-Canton railroad, the jurisdiction of the Chung-yüan Provisional Government

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was extended to give the Communists control over other provincial governments. The Military and Political Committee, which had jurisdiction over the six provinces of Central-South China, was established in February 1950. These provinces, with the exception of a part of Honan and Hupeh, came under the domination of the Communists after the crossing of the Yangtze River in 1949. The Communist conquest of the southern provinces was successful because of the factors described in a report made by Teng Tzu-hui, vice-chairman of the Military and Political Committee, in February 1950:

"For the purpose of annihilation of the enemy army and liberation of the people, we depended mainly upon the heroic efforts of the People's Liberation Army. The logistic support, or Aid-to-the-War-Front Drive, also fulfilled a mission of great importance. This was a complicated and heavy responsibility. During the months of March and April of last year, we had to give supplies to the Second Field Army of 400,000 men who passed through Honan and Hupeh to cross the Yangtze Valley. In May and June of the same year, we had to supply the Fourth Field Army of 1,000,000 men who marched through the provinces. In the months of September and October we were called upon for the third time to supply the 600,000 men of the Second Field Army for an expedition to the Southwest Region, and it also became necessary to send reinforcements for these armies which fought side by side in the south and west of China. Our rallying cry was 'All for the support of the war-front; all for the battlefield; all for the victory!'[1]

1. Teng Tzu-hui, "Ch'ien Chung-yüan Lin-shih Cheng-fu Chin I-nien-lai Ti Shih-cheng Pao-kao" [Report on the Administration of the Former Chung-yuan Provisional Government during the Past Year,"], Tu-pao Shou-ts'e [Newspaper Reading Handbook], Hankow, Ch'ang-chiang jih-pao she, 1950, p. 263.

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The main task of the Aid-to-the-War-Front Drive was to assure the supply of food and other necessities and to carry wounded troops to areas of safety. In districts where revolutionary governments were already in existence, supply stations were readily formed at important points. In areas where there was no revolutionary government, the armies depended on the detachment of civilian workers who followed the armies and also on the temporarily formed peace-preservation corps for collection of food and forage, and for transportation arrangements. The following is an incomplete list of the amounts of supplies to the Communist field armies in this region.

Supplies for Communist Field Armies (Nov. 1949)*

Supplies#	Amount Supplied
Food.....	480,241,293 catties (528,265,422 lbs.)
Firewood	322,788,208 catties (355, 067,029 lbs.)
Grass for horses....	118,193,268 catties (130,012,595 lbs.)
Other fodder..	75,469,000 catties (83,015,900 lbs.)

*/ Teng Tzu-hui, "Ch'ien Chung-yüan Lin-shih Cheng-fu Chin-i-nien-lai Ti Shih-cheng Pao-kao" [Report on the Administration of the Former Chung-yüan Provisional Government during the Past Year"], Tu-pao Shou-ts'e [Newspaper Reading Handbook], Hankow, Ch'ang chiang jih-pao she, 1950, p. 625.

#/ Supplies from the provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi are not included.

In addition, the Chung-yuan Provisional Government organized laborers, who gave the equivalent of 30,329,080 work-days to aid the Communist field armies on the march. The workers repaired 2,188 kilometers

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(1,367.5 miles) of railroad lines, 145 bridges, 12,516 kilometers (7,822.5 miles) of highways, and 1,293 highway bridges, according to the Communist report.[2]

Teng Tzu-hui explained the difficulty of the task. "Except for Honan and part of Hupeh which belonged to the old liberation area, the other four provinces, excluding Hainan Island, were liberated within six months, so the responsibility of taking-over was a heavy one."[3]

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The Communists first seized power in the urban districts, which contained the largest number of persons sympathetic to Communism, and then extended their influence to the rural districts. A great number of cadres of the Communist Party including 10,000 from North China, 8,000 from Northeast China, and 5,000 from Central China, were drafted and sent to this region to assist. Underground workers were also employed in Hunan, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi. In each province a "revolutionary university" was established to train educated men and women for the service of the Party. Approximately 200 to 300 men and women were enlisted in each country, and altogether a total of 200,000 inhabitants of Central-South China were trained for Party work. All existing governmental institutions were kept as they were, but employed personnel had to undergo the process of re-education in Communist doctrine. The old personnel under the pao-chia system (an organization established on the local level for the promotion of public safety) was left intact in order to avoid disturbances and to maintain a system of village defense. Shortly thereafter, the Communists organized peasants' associations, trade unions, and women's federations, thus encompassing all groups.[4]

2. Ibid., p. 625.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p. 626.

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At the time of the Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries Movement in the cities, which was climaxed by the use of violence in 1951, a similar campaign was carried out in rural areas. Official reports during this time indicated the unrest and the resistance of the peasants, expressed in the forms of organized "underground armies," the killing of militia, the burning of granaries, and the slaughtering of cattle. In Hupeh,[23] in one month of 1950, 88 rural robberies were reported, in which 49 military cadre were killed and 264 cattle were slaughtered. In Kwangsi Province during 1950-51, over 3,000 Communist cadres were murdered.[24]

In connection with the maintenance of rural order, at least two important measures were taken. One was the suppression of the landlords and the other was the establishment of rural security committees. Prior to the issuance of the directive by the Central-South China Military and Political Committee, landlords in the rural areas were placed under the authority of the military command and the militia. According to the order concerning the punishment of landlords issued by the Central-South China Military and Political Committee[25] in November 1950, those who resisted land reform were to be tried by the People's tribunal. Those sentenced to life imprisonment or to imprisonment

23. Report of Li Hsien, Yangtze Daily, April 25, 1951, p. 5.

24. Official report of P'eng Chen, ibid., Feb. 23, 1951, p. 1.

25. Ibid., Nov. 17, 1950, p. 1.

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and members of secret societies, in addition to those agents included in the first definition. This means that obviously anyone whose actions seem contrary to Communist principles can be labeled a "counterrevolutionary." In the following discussion, these groups of "counterrevolutionaries" will be treated separately, although it must be noted that clear lines of demarcation do not exist among these groups, and that the Communists in using these terms do not undertake to define them in a clear-cut manner.

A. "Bandits"

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The Chinese often use the term "bandit" to designate all underground and openly rebellious armed forces. (A current example of this usage is found in the Formosa press, which refers to the Communists on the China Mainland as bandits.) The particularly intensive Communist campaigns against such armed "bandits" in Central-South China can be attributed to the fact that certain mountainous areas in the region have been used as refuges by rebels. The largest concentrations of bandits in this region have been reported in Kwangsi Province and in western Hunan and Kwangtung provinces. At one time Communist officials admitted the existence of 800,000 bandits in Central-South China.[1]

Communist military campaigns against "bandits" in this region may be grouped into three stages,[2] each characterized by different strategic

1. Ch'ang-chiang Jih-pao [Yangtze Daily], Hankow, August 30, 1950.

2. See reports by T'ao Chu and T'an Cheng in Yangtze Daily, Sept. 23, 1950; Sept. 20, 1950, p. 1. Also consult reports on Kwangtung, Kiangsi provinces in same newspaper, Sept. 25, 1950, pp. 2, 3.

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and tactical maneuvers. However, all such campaigns were reported concluded by the end of 1950. During the first stage, regular and militia troops were used in drives against the remnants of Nationalist forces. The main base of operation was in Kwangsi Province, where the presence of 300,000 Kuomintang troops had been reported. The objective of the Communists was to drive the Nationalist forces to areas where the latter's annihilation would be possible.

During the second stage, regular Communist troops were employed with some militia assisting in key areas. When the Kuomintang forces and other local armed bands were cornered, the fighting grew in intensity. The Communist strategy called for concentrated attack on key points. Communist cadres strengthened the political work in their fighting units to boost morale and spread propaganda among the civilians in Communist-occupied areas to enlist popular support.

Military actions during the third stage were less systematic. After a series of decisive battles, Kuomintang troops and local armed bands broke up into smaller units. Toward the end of this stage Communist troops used small task forces to carry out intensive raids, which were called "campaigns of annihilation." These raids were reported to be successful because the Communists by that time had organized the support of the villagers.

Except for the "bandit extermination" campaigns in Kwangsi Province, which were not completed until April 1953, other provinces in this region declared

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that organized opposition had been wiped out before the end of 1950. According to Teng Tzu-hui, vice-chairman of the Central-South China Military and Political Committee, these campaigns had eliminated a total of 1,150,000 bandits and 106,000 weapons had been seized from the enemy,[3] although later statistics on these campaigns in Central-South China are not available, unrest persisted and found expression in robberies and organized sabotage. An editorial in the People's Daily of Peking for November 11, 1954 warned of renewed "bandit activity."[4] It mentioned in particular the existence of a bandit group, 7,000 strong, in the area of O-hsien in Hupeh Province. This would indicate that, although armed bandits were less active, their potential threat to the regime had not been completely eradicated.

B. Landlords

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The aboliton of the absentee land-ownership system is one of the basic aims of Communism. In Communist China, the elimination of the landlords as a class in the rural community was made the primary goal in the Land Reform Movement. However, an investigation of Communist reports on landlords after the land reform in 1951 shows that here again the term "landlord" is very loosely defined. Many of those who were accused of belonging to the landlord class in Central-South China did not actually own any land. Among them were political dissenters, including expelled Communists.

Since it is impossible to ascertain the exact number of landowners in this region, it is difficult

3. Yangtze Daily, December 13, 1951, p. 1.
4. People's Daily, November 10, 1954. p. 1,

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

1. Extermination of the Remnants of Nationalist Troops

669

As has been mentioned, by the end of 1950 most of the remnants of Nationalist troops in Central-South China collapsed as a result of repeated Communist assaults. Some of them, however, managed to escape to the mountains and remained at large. The Communist round-up of these men resulted in the arrest and execution of 44 in Kwangsi Province, early in 1951.[10] They were accused of having served as regimental or other high-ranking commanders in the Nationalist Army, and now commanded new rebellious armed bands. These bands were known as "Anti-Communist National Salvation Armies," "Anti-Communist Self-preservation Columns," "Self-preservation Guerrilla Columns," and "Southeast Asia Democratic Allied Forces." The bands were small, and no attempt had been made to consolidate them under a single command.

2. Liquidation of Former "Counter-revolutionaries"

687

The Central-South Military and Political Committee issued a directive in October 1950, stressing the need to investigate persons who had committed crimes against Communism in the past, and mistried cases involving such people. As of July 1951, according to incomplete statistics, 7,598 such mistried cases had been investigated and disposed of in this region.[11] The amazing speed with which they

10. Yangtze Daily, May 5, 1951, p. 1.
11. Yangtze Daily, July 27, 1951, p. 3.

M /21 cont./
*101 is washed out and the designs appear. The sixth month is regarded
CC as the beginning of the year. Ox and wine are used in sacrifices
563 to Heaven. When they are sick they do not use medicine, but
M consult sorcerers. Even the poor must kill an animal as a
[805] sacrifice. Before making a move they must divine its propitious-
[782] ness by breaking a reed or picking a chicken bone. Sping opens
[755] with New Year celebrations, in which men blow reed flutes
[787] and women accompany them by ringing tiny bells, dancing
[527] and singing, shoulder to shoulder.
[534] (18) The Yang Pao Miao. — They came from Tsun-I,
[167] Kweichow, being the descendants of the Po chieftain, Yang
Ying-lung. In the thirtieth year of Hung-wu /1397/ in the
Ming period, the Miao complained about the heavy taxation
M and requested a reduction. The then chu-pu /keeper of records/
648 of Lu-ch'i hsien, Sun Ying-lung, went into the native area to
175 calm them. Sun Ying-lung took the chief of the tribe, Yang
CC Erh, to the capital to send up a memorial requesting the establish-
175 ment of a military and civil Ch'ien Hu So /"thousand men
563 office," The Ch'ien hu was a military station official, in charge
669 of 1,000 men. He and his men held hereditary positions/ at
Chen-ch'i, to pacify the area and set up headquarters, introduce
the new system, with 124 villages organized into ten districts,
and Yang Erh was appointed Po Hu Chang /"100 men leader"/
to control them. Afterward because the Miao at Chen-ch'i
became aggressive, often causing the local officials trouble,
and also because of the isolation of the area and the difficulty
of access, the sub-prefecture /t'ing/ was abolished. The temple
M of Yang Lao Ling Kung worshiped by the Miao was actually
*101 built by Yang Erh. They are all said to be descendants of the
CC Po chieftain.
563
(19) Tzu Chiang Miao. — They originally came from
M Ch'ing-p'ing and Tu-yün in Kweichow. They are fond of fight-
[346] ing and killing. Whenever they sacrifice to the spirits they
[167] mount a ladder made of swords /knives?/. In 1795, in the
[782] reign of Ch'ien Lung, the revolts at Ya-pao-chai and Chi-to-
[648] p'ing mainly involved this tribe. Today there are still some at
CC Ting-niu and Yen-lo.
[669]

/105 cont./

C 175 631 563 M * 175 631 * 648 622 C [669] After the voluntary change from the native headmen in the Miao frontier region, in each Miao village there was set up a local village chief over 100 families /i.e., a pe hu chai ch'ang, "100 families village chief"/, in order to govern the Miao and bring them under the administration of government officials. But the chiefs of the 100 families were not always Miao, sometimes Chinese being appointed to these positions. As time passed, gradually, there were rapacious, unscrupulous rogues, whose mistreatment caused disturbances,, so that the unprecedented Miao rebellion took place during the sixtieth year of Ch'ien Lung /1795/. When the Miao rebellion was put down in the first year of Chia Ch'ing /1796/, it was found that the policy of governing the Miao with Chinese was wrong. The then governor-general of Hunan and Kwangtung, Pi Yüan, submitted a plan to govern the Miao with Miao. (6) The ministry's

M [113]

6. See Pi Yüan: "Tsou Wu Chi Kan-chou Yung-pao Miao Jen Su /A Memorial Sent to the Throne Concerning the Bringing of the Miao People Together in Peace/" in Miao Fang-Pei Lan, Vol. 19, "I Wen Chih /Literary Archives/."

response to the memorial setting up regulations for Miao officials, Miao Chiang Chin-/106/ Yao Shan-Hou Shih I /Important Remedial Measures for the Miao Frontier Region/, has a passage, "Miao Chiang Pe Hu Chai Ch'ang Ming-Mu Ying Cho Liang Keng Ting /The Names of the Village Leaders of 100 Families Should be Decided after Due Deliberation/," stating: "According to the memorial, in the three provinces of Szechwan, Kweichow, and Hupeh, such areas as Yu-yang and T'ung-jen were all previously governed by headmen, but following their application to be put under government officials, the administrative areas of chou, hsien, and ying

/110 cont./

C 175 631 563 701 M *175 631 *648 622 701 [162]

The fourth, sixth, seventh, and eighth tu /subdivision of a hsien/ in Pao-ching each had a Miao shou-pei, nine ch'ien-tsung, 12 pa-tsung, 31 wai-wei, and 300 Miao soldiers. (2)

2. Pao-ching Hsien Chih, Vol. 5.

The Miao officials appointed at Ku-chang-p'ing included one shou-pei, two ch'ien-tsung, four pa-tsung, 12 wai-wei, and 100 Miao soldiers, controlling 58 Miao villages. (3)

3. Ku-chang-p'ing T'ing Chih, Vol. 2.

Regulations concerning Miao officials were set up in the second year of Chia Ch'ing (1797), and were still in existence when the authors were carrying out their investigations in the Miao area in 1933. The four yings — front, left, right, and middle — at Feng-huang have been made into eleven yings due to the presence of eleven shou-pei. The subdivisions of Pao-ching formerly called tu are now called ch'ü, but the structure remains the same.

C 631 563 701 [669] M 701 631 *648 622

Since the Miao rebellion during the Ch'ien Lung reign period /1736-95/, the authorities have prohibited Chinese from entering Miao country. Furthermore, since the Miao dreaded seeing Chinese officials, then the Miao shou-pei, ch'ien-tsung, pa-tsung, and wai-wei were set up with the responsibility of controlling the Miao. In cases when the Miao were involved in such affairs as fights or theft, these petty officers were charged with the responsibility of apprehending the offenders. For the official despatches to be sent it was necessary to rely on them to get the messengers, and the pressing for rents and grain were also under the Miao officials' control. Moreover, the Miao petty officials were asked to submit seasonal affidavits as to whether there were Chinese entering the Miao villages.

[Text continues on p165]

/112 cont./

C 631 563 701 M 631 622 *648 701 [177]

The policy of having Miao officials to govern the Miao has been in practice now for 140 years. At the time of the original separation of the execution and administrative functions between the Chinese and the Miao, the idea of Miao regulating the Miao could be said to have been aimed at the abuses of the time. But now after a hundred and some tens of years, the Miao have gradually been sinicized. Formerly, there was the difference between the civilized and uncivilized Miao, but today they have all become civilized. The policy of separate administration for the Miao and the Chinese has been informally discarded. Consequently, the regulations for Miao officials should be abolished. But, since the Republic, the Miao officials are still able to exist, largely because Chinese officials have been profiting by taking bribes for filling official posts. On the other hand, since the Miao officials get their positions through paying bribes, they go to great lengths to make extortions from the Miao people. The Miao people detest the Miao petty officials more than they do the Chinese officials. Moreover, today, the various hsien in the Miao area have been changed to the system of hsiang /villages/ and chen /towns/, each governed by a head, known as hsiang chang or chen chang, respectively. In view of this change, Miao officials have become superfluous. It is hoped that the authorities in the region will be able to do away with them soon.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

C 175 563 669 M *175 *648 C [712]

T'UN FIELDS

(1) Successive Changes in T'un Defense

Trouble with the Miao in western Hunan began in the Ming dynasty. But because of using an administrative policy of blockade against Miao country, the 270 years under the Ming

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C 175 563 669 712 M *175 *648

/113 cont./ did not witness serious trouble. The method of this blockade consisted of setting up stone guard posts /tiao-pao/, establishing guard stations /ying shao/, and building border walls, strictly demarcating the boundary between the Chinese and Miao areas, without allowing any infringement by one on the other. The section on government in the historical section of Miao Fang Pei Lan, recording the system of defense against the Miao during the Ming dynasty, has this to say: "During the fifth year of Hsüan Te /i.e. 1430/, the senior official /chang kuan/ at Kan-tzu-p'ing, Wu Pi-lang, and the Miao of Tung-jen, Kweichow, started a rebellion. The brigadier general /tsung ping kuan/, Hsiao Shou, built 24 guard posts /pao/ around the area to protect it. In the thirty-first year of Chia Ching /i.e. 1552/, the Miao in Hupeh-Hunan and Kweichow were pacified.

C 175 563 712

The Court sent Governor General Chang Yo to hold down Yüan-chou. Yo in consultation with Assistant Commissioner /fu shih/ Kao Hsien, and Lieutenant Colonel /ts'an chiang/ Sun Hsien drew up a plan to abolish the guard posts at Wan-chi. Then he built 12 outposts /shao/ called: Wu-chai, Yung-an, Ch'ing-ch'i, Ho-k'ou, Kan-tzu, Kan-chou, Ch'iang-hu, Shih-yang, Shao-p'o, Tung-hsin, Shui-t'ang-yao, Shui-t'ien-ying, which with that at Chen-ch'i-so came to 13 in all. Every guard station had a wall, a tower, a drill yard, a narrow gate, an office, and a community storehouse /she ts'ang/. The officer corps

C 175 563 701

included a tu-pei /"head of senior soldiers"/, ling-pan /"section leader"/, ling-tui /"company leader"/, ling-cheng /"recruitment and arms officer?"/, kuan-piao /"keeper of banners"/, kuan-ts'ang /"keeper of the storehouse"/, and li-mu /"head constable and keeper of the jail"/. The local official had under him t'ou-mu /"headmen"/, she-jen /"official secretaries"/, shih-tzu /"readers"/, chien-pu /"strong walkers"/, ta-shou /?lit., "move the hands"/ hsiang-t'u /?lit., geographers"/, po-k'ai /heralds/, and the Ch'i Miao soldiers. In all the officers and men totaled 6,000 or more, commanded by a lieutenant colonel /ts'an-chiang piao ying/, with a second

M [701]

/114 cont./

During the Ts'ung Cheng reign period /1628/ /the end of the Ming dynasty/, the Miao rebelled, demolishing the guard stations and leveling the border wall. The "Great Wall" to blockade Miao country disappeared. The 7,800 guard troops /shou ping/ in the Miao area of the Ming dynasty were reduced to 1,600 men at the beginning of the Ch'ing dynasty. When the rebellion of Wu San-kwei was pacified and all was peaceful again, there was another reduction of 500 men, leaving 1,100 men. Military strengh was slight and the defense system was relaxed. Further, following the change from native headmen to Chinese officials, and the use of Chinese as the head of every hundred families, intercourse between the Chinese and the Miao was no longer prohibited. In the twenty-ninth year of Ch'ien Lung /i.e. 1764/, in view of the Miao having undergone acculturation for a long time, they were allowed to intermarry with the Chinese. The original idea was to change the Miao by teaching, but with the passing of time evils developed, when rapacious Chinese under the pretext of trade entered the Miao area and seduced crafty Miao to enter into thievery. Unlike soldiers they entered Miao country for personal reasons and mistreated the Miao. The Miao made a pretext of these guest men's exploitations and encroachments on their land and banded together to make trouble, and brought about the great rebellion during the Ch'ien Lung /1736-95/ and Chia Ch'ing /1796-1820/ reign periods. After the rebellion was put down, the Manchu court realized that the time was yet inopportune to change the Miao by teaching, and the blockade policy was once more used. The various hsiens along the Miao border were heavily garrisoned for protection.

Cheng-kan-chen /Chen-kan Brigade/ was set up at Fenghuang, headed by a brigade general /tsung ping kuan/, controlling four ying /battalions/ —middle, right, front, and left, with three majors, one captain /tu-szu/, four second captains /shou-pei/, eight lieutenants /ch'ien-tsung/, 19 sergeants /pa-tsung/, 23 corporals /wai-wei/, 14 supernumeraries /e-wai/, and a total of 3,389 soldiers.

2:Ling & Ruey--185 E-5 (1933) 1947 AE5 Miao AE5
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/126 cont./

obliterated. There is no longer the need for this kind of system of t'un defense against the Miao. In fact, unrest in the Miao area today is often due to the maladministration of the t'un fields system. The Miao petty officers and the t'un leaders often are oppressive in collecting rent and sometimes are corrupt in their methods, thus causing dissatisfaction and disturbances. In the twenty-sixth year of the Republic /1937/ the Miao rebellion in western Hunan arose because of the t'un land system. It resulted in the burning of t'un granaries and killing of t'un officers. Although the rebellion was pacified only after bloody and expensive campaigns, it is imperative to change the t'un and enter the newly opened or reclaimed land as available for taxation, so as to reach a fundamental solution.

/127/ CHAPTER EIGHT

MAGIC AND RELIGION

The Englishman, Bronislaw Malinowski, has said: "There are no people however primitive without religion and magic. Nor are there, it must be added at once, any savage races lacking either in the scientific attitude or in science, though this lack has been frequently attributed to them. In every primitive community, studied by trustworthy and competent observers, there have been found two clearly distinguishable domains, the Sacred and the Profane; in other words, the domain of Magic and Religion and that of Science." (1) According to the report

1. Malinowski: "Wu-shu K'o-hsüeh yü Tsung-chiao /Magic, Science and Religion/," paper in Science, Religon and Reality by